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OR I G I NA L A RT I C L E
Effects of globalizing a consumer-friendly firm into
an asymmetric mixed duopoly
1 | INTRODUCTION
Theworld’s economy is moving towards high levels of globalization. Some countries have created alliances with the aim
of establishing a singlemarket.1 In this way, countries allow themovement of goodswithin the union as if it were a single
country. For companies this represents greater business opportunities and access to a larger number of customers and
suppliers. Meanwhile, consumers would be expected to benefit frommore competitive prices.
Several authors have investigated the effects that globalization and free trade have on consumers, profits and
welfare. For example, Markusen (1981), Cordella (1993) and Dong and Yuan (2010) showed that the welfare under free
trade in a two-countrymodel can fall. Kameda and Ui (2012) study a globalized single market and analyze the effects
of symmetry on profits and consumer surplus when globalizingmonopolies into a single oligopolymarket. Amir et al.
(2017), as well, compare a globalized single integrated market with autarky and identifies general conditions under
which trade affects prices, outputs, export or import, consumer surplus, profits andwelfare.
On the other hand, recent world-wide trend is that many companies have acquired social awareness.2 As a subset
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) addressed by Porter and Kramer (2006), there exist initiatives oriented to the
consumers.3 A consumer-friendly firm is a firm of which social responsibility is oriented to the consumer. In specific,
consumer surplus-oriented CSR hasmodified the objectives of the firms that adopt it.4 Thus, consumer-friendly firms
do not only aim to maximize their own profits, but include consumer surplus in their decision-making process. In a
scenario where there are firms committed to consumer-friendliness, does globalization have a positive economic effect
on consumers, companies andwelfare?
In the previous literature, earlier efforts have beenmade to answer whether globalization is good for all consumers
and businesses and the welfare of the nations involved. It has been done, mostly, considering that the sole purpose
of companies is tomaximize their profits. However, it has become a common practice for private firms to implement
CSR activities as a business strategy. Recently,Wang et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2014) study "consumer-oriented"
initiatives in international duopolies. Wang et al. (2012) analyzes how the welfare is affected by consumer-friendly
1The European Union, established the single market since the 90s. According to the European Commission’s website, the single market refers to "the EU as
one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services". The Caribbean Community is another
example of single market and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was launchedwith plans for a fully integrated single market.
2According to the 19th Annual Global CEO Survey by PwC, 64% of CEOs claim that "corporate social responsibility (CSR) is core to their business rather than
being a stand-alone program". They interviewed 1409 CEOs in 83 countries.
3CSRmight be oriented to the environment, to the employees or to the consumers, for instance.
4For example, Nakamura (2014), Chang et al. (2014), Kopel (2015),Matsumura and Ogawa (2014, 2016), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015) and
Flores and García (2016), to mention some, use consumer surplus as a proxy of the firm’s CSR
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initiative of two foreign exporting firms in a third country’s market. Whereas Chang et al. (2014) examine the welfare
effect when both home and foreign firms adopt a consumer-friendly posture in a domestic country.5
However, the global market addressed in the above works is different to the integrated single market.6 Our
work examines the integration of separatedmonopolies into a single duopolymarket. Moreover, we contemplate the
heterogeneous objectives of the firms, which conforms amixed duopoly. Mixed oligopolies have been studied for some
decades. Traditionally, private firms that only maximize their profits interact with public firm whose purpose is to
maximize (weighted) welfare. Early studies include Cremer et al. (1991), De Fraja andDelbono (1989), Harris andWiens
(1980), Matsumura (1998), to mention some. Recent economic literature onmixed oligopolies addresses the interaction
between private for-profit firms and non-profit organizations or private firmswith corporate social responsibility.7
In this research line, we consider a mixed market that one of the firms adopts a consumer-friendly strategy by
committing to consumers of themarket in which operates. Thenwe analyze the effects of globalization on consumer
surplus, profits, price, exports andwelfare. We focus our study on the role of the technical advantage that a firm has
over the other and the relative size of themarkets.
To the best of our knowledge, the previous literature has not identified the conditions for the case where there
exist a firm that is socially responsible being friendly to consumers. Although CSR is an important issue at present,
little has been studied in the context of globalization or free trade. Our work provides certain conditions under which
globalization increases or decreases consumer surplus, profits andwelfare in a two-marketsmodel. The story in this
paper is as follows: Before globalization the non for-profit firm is friendly to consumers in its market of origin and after
globalization is friendly to the consumers of the global market. The latter assumption is made considering that after
globalization the firm operates in the global market, 8 but it is also comparedwith the case that after globalization the
firm is friendly to the consumers of its original market. Finally, we also extend the analysis into amixed oligopoly market
where the consumer-friendly firm competes with a for-profit firm in its original market before globalization and the
other for-profit firm in the counterpart market after globalization.
The followings aremain findings of our study. Under the assumption that the non-profit firm is friendly to the global
consumers, on the one hand, consumers in themarket of the for-profit firm are always better off after globalization than
before. The for-profit firmmay benefit from globalization only if its local market is very small compared to its trading
partner and has sufficient technical advantage ormoderate disadvantage. If globalization benefits the for-profit firm,
themarket must export which implies that its output rises. A higher output guarantees a welfare gain in this market.
On the other hand, consumers in the original market of the consumer-friendly firm are not always better off after
globalization. Thus, being friendly to the global consumers may hurt consumers in its original market or reduce its
welfare after globalization. Differently from the results of Amir et al. (2017), if globalization hurts the consumers in
this local market, it does not necessarily increases the consumer-friendly firm’s profits unless it has sufficiently large
technical advantage. This means that globalizationmay hurt simultaneously consumers and firms of this local market, in
which case thewelfare of this market decreases. It may also lead to a loss in global welfare after globalization under
certain conditions. However, consumers in the original market of the consumer-friendly firm are always better off
after globalization if the firm is only friendly to consumers in its original market before and after globalization. Finally,
duopolistic competition between a consumer-friendly firm and a for-profit firm in the original market can increase not
5As a related work on the strategic trade and privatization policies in an international mixed oligopoly, see, for example, Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005),
Dadpay andHeywood (2006), Lee et al. (2013) and Cato andMatsumura (2015).
6Kameda and Ui (2012) distinguish between two types of global markets: (a) the free trade market which allows the existence of n different markets with a
separate supplier; and (b) a single integratedmarket in which all producers compete.
7See, for example, Königstein andMüller (2001), Kopel andBrand (2012), Goering (2007), Kopel et al. (2014), Flores andGarcía (2016) andCho and Lee (2017).
8AsPorter andKramer (2006) expressed, “any business that pursues its ends at the expense of the society inwhich it operateswill find its success to be illusory
and ultimately temporary”.
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only the local welfare in the original market but global welfare after globalization than under themonopoly case that
only the consumer-friendly firm exists in the original market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the basic model. First, we determine the optimal values of
outputs, prices, profits and consumer surplus before globalization, for eachmarket. Then, we examine the corresponding
equilibrium values after globalization. Section 3 analyzes the effect of globalization on consumers, companies, and
markets. It is done through the determination of conditions that indicate when those variables are increased or reduced.
Section 4 compares the previous results with the case where after globalization the not-for-profit firm is friendly only to
the local consumers in its original market. We also examine the welfare effect of globalization on themixed duopoly in
the original market with the consumer-friendly firm. The final section concludes the paper.
2 | MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Themodel consists of two producers and two correspondingmarkets. A consumer-friendly firm and a for-profit firm
produce one homogeneous commodity. We consider two cases: The first one is "separated monopolies" with two
markets inwhich each producer serves only the demand of the correspondingmarket while the other is "mixed duopoly"
where twomarkets are united into a single globalizedmarket.
2.1 | Assumptions
Denote the quantity produced by firm i , i = 0, 1 by qi (qi ≥ 0). Firm 0 is a consumer-friendly firm while firm 1 is a
for-profit firm. In addition, wemake the following assumptions about demand and cost functions.
Before uniting the markets
A1.1. The demand inmarket 0 is q0 = a − p0, where p0 is the price. In market 1 the demand is q1 = γ (a − p1), where
p1 is the price and γ > 0measures the relative size of market 1 to the market 0: 0 < γ < 1 indicates that market 1 is
smaller thanmarket 0; on the contrary, γ > 1 indicates that market 1 is bigger thanmarket 0; γ = 1 indicates that market
1 is the same size as market 0.
A1.2. Firm i , i = 0, 1, has a quadratic cost function:9
fi (qi ) = 1
2
k i q
2
i , where k i > 0
We use this functional form in order to determine the role of technical advantage in production on the effects
of globalizing two separated markets. Let k0 = 1 and k1 = k , where k defines the concept of technical advantage.
According to Flores andGarcía (2016), we can say that firm i has technical advantage over firm j if firm i can produce the
same output with firm j at lower marginal cost and total cost. That is, if k < 1 the for-profit firm has technical advantage
over the consumer-friendly firm; if k > 1 the opposite is true. If k = 1 no firm has technical advantage over the other.
Note that, even if the consumer-friendly firm has technical advantage (k > 1), the for-profit firm can be technically more
efficient than the consumer-friendly firm at themargin if q0 > k q1.
After uniting the markets
A2.1. The global demand isQ = (1 + γ)(a − pw )where pw is the global price.
9FollowingDe Fraja andDelbono (1989),Wang andWang (2009),Wang et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2014) and Flores andGarcía (2016), we adopt usual assump-
tion on the cost function in the analysis of mixed oligopolies. That is, we consider a competition with decreasing returns to scale (quadratic cost).
4 AUTHORS (ANON)
2.2 | Objective functions of the companies
Before uniting the markets
Recall that before globalization a single company in eachmarket is selling the commodity. The profit function of the
firm i is:
piBi (qi ) = pi qi −
1
2
k i q
2
i (1)
Firm 1, the for-profit firm, seeks profit maximization only. Firm 0, on the other hand is consumer-friendly. It takes
both its own profits and consumer surplus into consideration. FollowingWang et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2014), we
define the objective function that firm 0maximizes:
UB (q0) = piB0 (q0) + CS0(q0) (2)
whereCS0(q0) = 12 q20 is the consumer surplus in market 0.10
The optimal outputs and prices for both firms and bothmarkets are shown in appendix A. Note that the production
in the single market i corresponds to the demand of suchmarket, i.e., q i = q (c)i .
The respective optimal values piBi andUB can be found by substituting q i and p¯i , (i ∈ {0, 1}) in (1) and (2). The
consumer surplus in market 0 would be CS0 = 12 q20 and in market 1, CS1 = 12γ q21. The social welfare in market i is
W i = pi
B
i + CS i .
After uniting the markets
After globalization, there is an integratedmarket where both companies compete in a classic mixed duopoly. The
price at this stage is determined in the global market, so it obeys the inverse demand function in assumption A2.1.
The profit function of firm i is:
piAi (qi ) = pw qi −
1
2
k i q
2
i (3)
Firm 1 chooses its output to maximize profits. Firm 0 is still consumer-friendly; it wants to maximize its profits
and consumer surplus. However, after uniting the markets, the firm 0 is friendly to the consumers of the entire
market it serves. It means that the objective function of firm 0 considers the consumer surplus of the global market
CS (Q ) = 12(γ+1)Q 2 and its own profit, but not include the profit of firm 1.11
Wedefine the objective function of firm 0 is as follows:
UA(q0) = piA0 (q0) + CS (Q ) (4)
The equilibrium outputs and price are shown in appendix A. Note that the quantity demanded by consumers in
market 0 is q˜ (c)0 = a − p˜w and by consumers in market 1 is q˜ (c)1 = γ (a − p˜w ).
The equilibrium values piA
i
and U˜A can be found by substituting q˜i , (i ∈ {0, 1}) and p˜w in (3) and (4). The consumer
surplus for market 0 and 1would be C˜ S0 = 12
(
q˜
(c)
0
)2 and C˜ S1 = 12γ (q˜ (c)1 )2, respectively. The social welfare inmarket i
isW˜i = piAi + C˜ S i .
10Thus, firm 0maximizes total social welfare in market 0, which can be interpreted as a public monopoly in a single market configuration.
11In this sense, firm 0 is not a public firm in the entire market, which is different with the classical objective function of public firm in amixedmarket.
AUTHORS (ANON) 5
3 | RESULTS
In order to find the effects of globalization in eachmarket, we define the ratios of the equilibrium values after globaliza-
tion to the separated optimal values before globalization.
R
p
i
=
p˜w
p i
, R
q (c)
i
=
q˜
(c)
i
q
(c)
i
, R
q
i
=
q˜i
q i
Rpii =
piA
i
piBi
, R csi =
C˜ S i
CS i
, RWi =
W˜i
W i
(5)
Total production and total welfare ratios are, respectively, RQ = Q˜
q0+q1
and RW = W˜0+W˜1
W 0+W 1
. All the ratios are shown
in appendix B.
In the below, we determine conditions under which these ratios are greater or smaller than 1. When the ratio
of a variable is less than 1, then there is degradation of that variable as a result of globalization. In addition, we find
conditions under which amarket must export or import the good.12
3.1 | Effects on price and quantity demanded
Proposition 3.1 Globalization reduces the price paid in consumer-friendly firm’s original market if and only if 0 < k < 2
γ+γ2
.
The price perceived by market 0 drops down (its quantity demanded increases) after globalization if the new
competing firm 1 has a larger technical advantage over the consumer-friendly firm. On the contrary, if the for-profit
company has a larger technical disadvantage, this would push up the price inmarket 0 after globalization. The reason
is that firm 0 does not maximize the entire welfare after globalization even though it maximizes its local welfare
before globalization. Thus, competitiveness matters on the price in market 0, in which the relative technical advantage
influences the price ratio.
Also, the relative size of the market influences the price ratio and the magnitude of output substitution. As a
sufficient condition, for example, when market 0 is larger or at least has the same size as market 1 (0 < γ ≤ 1), the
presence of a for-profit firm with the technical advantage (0 < k < 1) after globalization will push down the price
and raise the quantity demanded bymarket 0. Nevertheless, if the for-profit firm has no technical advantage but its
disadvantage is small enough (1 ≤ k < 2
γ+γ2
), the consumers in market 0would still perceive a fall in the price and would
raise its quantity demanded.
In contrast, if themarket 0 is the smallest one (γ > 1), the presence of a firmwith the technical disadvantage (k > 1)
would push up the price in market 0 (its quantity demanded decreases). However, if the for-profit firm has the technical
advantage, the rise in the price and the fall in quantity demandedwould occur if this advantage is relatively moderate
( 2
γ+γ2
< k < 1).
Proposition 3.2 Globalization reduces the price paid in for-profit firm’s original market regardless of the relative size of the
trading partner and which firm has technical advantage.
On the other hand, the price perceived by market 1 drops down after globalization irrespective of technical
advantage of the new competing firm 0. The reason is that this market is more competitive and consumer-friendly firm 0
12All the proofs of Propositions are provided in appendix B
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considers consumer surplus inmarket 1 after globalization, which always increases total quantity demanded inmarket 1.
Thus, consumers in market 1will perceive a decrease in the price after globalization.
3.2 | Effects on output production
Proposition 3.3 Consumer-friendly firm’s output and total production rise after globalization, regardless of the relative size of
the trading partner and which firm has technical advantage.
According to Amir et al. (2017), a typical result of free trade is that it stimulates production when all the firms are
profit maximizers since an increase in firm’s output has a less negative impact on the price. Thus, given the same price,
the companies would producemore after globalization. Proposition 3.3 states that it remains true in the context where
one of the firms is consumer-friendly. In ourmodel, the consumer-friendly firm always producesmore, regardless of
the cost of each firm. The reason is that this firmweighs the consumer surplus of bothmarkets where it serves, which
increases its production to compensate and even surpass the possible reduction of the for-profit company’s output (if
such a reduction exists). In such a way that the total production of the global market is higher after globalization than
before. This result is contrast with Dong and Yuan (2010) and Amir et al. (2017), who show that a high-cost country
might end up producing less owing to an excessive output expansion by a low-cost country.
Proposition 3.4 For-profit firm’s output rises after globalization if and only if 0 < k < 2
γ+γ2
.
This proposition states that whether the production of the for-profit firm increases or not after globalization
depends on the value of k and γ. Note that this condition is exactly samewith that in Proposition 3.1. Particularly, if the
market 0 is larger or has the same size asmarket 1 (0 < γ ≤ 1), and the for-profit firm has the technical advantage or if its
disadvantage is relatively moderate, then its production increases after globalization. On the other hand, if themarket
0 is smaller and the for-profit firm has technical disadvantage or relatively moderate advantage, then its production
decreases with globalization.
3.3 | Effects on consumer surplus
Proposition 3.5 Globalization benefits consumers of consumer-friendly firm’s original market if and only if 0 < k < 2
γ+γ2
.
Proposition 3.6 Consumers in market 1 are better off after globalization, regardless of the relative size of the trading partner
and which firm has technical advantage.
Consumer surplus ratio in each market is the square of the quantity demanded ratio13: R cs
i
=
(
R
q (c)
i
)2
. Hence,
the consumer surplus of market i will be larger after globalization than before if and only if the quantity demanded by
consumers in market i increases. The conditions for the quantity demanded bymarket 0 to increase or decrease were
established in Proposition 3.1, those are the same conditions of Proposition 3.5 for the consumer surplus of market 0 to
increase or decrease. In Proposition 3.2 we also stated that the price inmarket 1 falls and the quantity demanded by
consumers increases regardless of the size of themarket or the cost of the firm, therefore consumer surplus of this will
increase.
13Rq
(c)
i
=
a−p˜w
a−pi , therefore, R
q (c)
i
> 1 if and only if Rp
i
< 1 (law of diminishing demand).
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We can provide economic explanations. Before and after globalization, firm 0 has an incentive of high production
because of its consumer-friendliness. In equilibrium (after globalization) the higher the total production, the higher the
consumption of eachmarket. In market 0, consumption was already high before globalization due to the friendliness of
the company 0. Thus, whether the consumer surplus of market 0 rises or falls in this market depends on cost parameter
and the relative size of themarket. On the other hand, the only firm that servesmarket 1 before globalization, has no
interest in the consumer, while after globalization there is a rival firm that has an interest in the consumers of the global
market, which inducesmarket 1’s consumption to be boosted in thismarket, resulting in consumer surplus of thismarket
larger than before.
3.4 | Effects on profits
Proposition 3.7 Globalization benefits the consumer-friendly firm if and only if k > 2(2+γ)2γ(1+γ)(4+3γ)
It implies that the profits of the consumer-friendly firm 0 drops down if it has a larger technical disadvantage over
the for-profit firm. This is because consumer-friendly firm 0 should produce larger outputs in order to increase total
consumer surplus in entire market. On the contrary, if the consumer-friendly company has a larger technical advantage,
then it is better off after globalization. Thus, globalization may reduce or increase the profit of firm 0. It is sharply
contrast with Amir et al. (2017), who found in a model with only for-profit firms that the firms and consumers of a
country cannot be both worse off with globalization. Unlike them, we show that the profits of the consumer-friendly
company and the consumers of its original market can beworse off with globalization simultaneously.
The relative size of themarkets will also influence the profits ratio. As a sufficient condition, if market 0 is larger
or not much smaller than its trading partner (0 < γ ≤ γ∗ ≈ 1.21956) and the consumer-friendly firm has a technical
disadvantage (0 < k < 1), its profit will fall after globalization. Thus, in order tomakemore profits after globalization,
the consumer-friendly firm needs to have relatively high technical advantage. If market 0 is even smaller (γ > γ∗), it
is enough that the consumer-friendly company has the technical advantage to benefit from globalization. It can also
achieve benefit from trade being at a disadvantage if it is relatively moderate.
Proposition 3.8 Globalization benefits the for-profit firm if and only if 0 < γ < 12
(
−1 + √5
) and 0 < k < 2(1−γ−γ2)
3γ+5γ2+2γ3
It implies that the for-profit firmmay benefit from globalization only if market 1 is very small compared to its trading
partner and has sufficient technical advantage or relatively moderate disadvantage. This is because the consumer-
friendly firm 0 cares about all consumers in the global market, which pushes up consumption in both individual markets.
As a result, as shown in Proposition 3.2, globalization reduces the price in market 1. Therefore, globalization turns out
to be good for firm 1’s profits only when it has sufficient technical advantage andmarket 1 is very small.
3.5 | Export/Import
Since this is a two-market model, one of the individual markets must export and the other import in a global market. To
find out if a market exports under globalization we have to compare the output of eachmarket with its consumption.
That is, a market i exports if it has excess quantity supplied: q˜i − q˜ (c)i > 0where
q˜0 − q˜ (c)0 = −
(
q˜1 − q˜ (c)1
)
= − a(1 − γ(1 + k (1 + γ)))(2 + γ)(2 + k (1 + γ)) (6)
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Proposition 3.9 The consumer-friendly firm’s original market exports to the for-profit firm’s original market either (i)if 0 < γ ≤
1 and k > 1−γ
γ+γ2
or (ii) if γ > 1.
It states that market 0will be the exporter either (i) if it has larger or the same size asmarket 1 and the consumer-
friendly firm has enough technical advantage or (ii) if it has smaller size thanmarket 1 .
3.6 | Effects onwelfare
Combining two effects on consumer surplus and the profits of the firm produces the total effects on welfare. First, the
ratio of Rw0 > 1 yields the following conditions.
Proposition 3.10 Globalization enhances the local welfare of market 0 either (i) if k > √2γ + 2γ(1+γ) or (ii) if 0 < γ < −1 +
√
2
and 0 < k < −√2γ + 2γ(1+γ) .
It includes the case that both consumer surplus in market 0 and the profit of the consumer-friendly firm are
improved simultaneously. Also, the welfare of market 0 increases after globalization if its firm’s losses are lower than its
consumers’ gains, or if its firm’s gains exceed its loss in consumers’ surplus.
Second, the ratio of Rw1 > 1 yields the following condition:
(2 + k γ)2
(
−6 − 5γ − 2γ2 + k 2γ(1 + γ)2 + k
(
−3 − 2γ + γ2
))
+(2 + γ)2((2 + k γ)(4 + k ) + 2k ) > 0.
(7)
Finally, the ratio of Rw > 1 yields the following condition:
(2 + k + k γ)2
(
2(−3 + k )γ2 + 2k 2γ3 + k 2γ4
)
+8
(
3 + γ + 2γ2 + k (γ − 1)2(1 + γ) − k 2γ(1 + γ)2
)
> 0.
(8)
It is difficult to analyze exact conditions algebraically, but we can visualize these results in figure. Figure 1 shows
how local welfare in bothmarkets and global welfare are affected by the relativemarket size and the cost parameter.
In figure 1, we can divide four different areas on the welfare effect. Area A represents that local welfare of both
markets increases simultaneously, which induces Pareto-improving result, while area B represents that local welfare of
bothmarkets decreases simultaneously, which induces Pareto-deteriorating result. Area C andD indicate the welfare
trade-off. Area C represents the case that thewelfare gain in onemarket dominates thewelfare loss in othermarket
and thus global welfare increases. Area D represents the reversed case and thus global welfare decreases.
Now, we can propose the following sufficient conditions:
Proposition 3.11 Globalization enhances the local welfare of market 0 if k > 1 and γ > 2.067 approximately.
It follows from Proposition 3.10. Thus, one of the sufficient conditions that guarantee a welfare gain for market 0 is
that themarket is less than half the size of its trading partner and the consumer-friendly firm has a technical advantage.
Since firm 0 is friendly to global consumers, its output increases. However, a higher output does not guarantee a welfare
gain formarket 0. If the profits of firm 0 increase after globalization, themarketmust export, and the consumers are
worse off after globalization.a welfare gain for market 1.
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F IGURE 1 Effects of globalization onwelfare.
Proposition 3.12 Globalization enhances the local welfare of market 1 if k > 12 or γ < 4.
It follows from (7). It states that if the for-profit has not a strong technical advantage, market 1 is better off after
globalization. Globalization also benefits market 1, regardless of the technical advantage if its market size is nomore
than approximately four times bigger. As shown, consumers in market 1 are always better off. If the profits of firm 1
increase after globalization, themarket must export and then its output increases. Thus, a higher output guarantees a
welfare gain for market 1.
Proposition 3.13 Globalization enhances world welfare if k > 1.
It states that there is no global welfare loss if firm 0 has technical advantage. (area A and C) That is, a global loss
would happen only when firm 0 has technical disadvantage. Then, the loss of local welfare in one of themarkets may
exceed the gains in the other market which would lead to a reduction of global welfare. (area D) This reduction will also
happen if the local welfare in each individual market decreases simultaneously. (area B)
4 | COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
4.1 | When the consumer-friendly firm only cares about its original consumers
If firm 0 is friendly only to consumers of its original market, it only considers the consumer surplus of the local market
CS0
(
q
(c)
0
)
= 12
(
Q
γ+1
)2, instead of the global consumer surplus. In that case, the consumer surplus in the local market
will bemore protected than the other case that the firm considers the global consumer surplus, while the profit of that
firmmight be reduced because of its less aggressiveness under the local protection. Wewill examine its welfare results
and compare with the results in the previous section.
The objective function of firm 0 becomes:
10 AUTHORS (ANON)
U (q0) = pi0(q0) + CS0
(
q
(c)
0
)
(9)
The equilibrium outputs and prices before and after globalization are shown in appendix C.
Proposition 4.1 When the consumer-friendly firm only cares about its original consumers, globalization benefits consumers in
market 0 if and only if 0 < k < 1
γ+γ2
, while it benefits consumers in market 1 regardless of the relative market size and technical
advantage.
This proposition is the same in Proposition 3.6 that consumers in market 1 are always better off, but it requires a
stronger condition than Proposition 3.5. As expected, the consumer-friendly firm produces less outputs because of the
protection of its original market and the for-profit firm increases outputs to export more: there is an output substitution
effect. In particular, we can show that the for-profit firm’s original market is the exporter, i.e., q˜0 − q˜ (c)0 = −
(
q˜1 − q˜ (c)1
)
=
a(1+γ)(−1+k γ(1+γ))
4+γ(7+2γ)+k (1+γ)(2+γ(4+γ)) , which is negative if k < 1γ+γ2 . Thus, globalization benefits consumers inmarket 0 only when the
for-profit firm has a higher technical advantage than the condition in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 4.2 When the consumer-friendly firm only cares about its original consumers, globalization enhances the local
welfare of market 0 regardless of the relative market size and technical advantage, while it enhances the local welfare of market
1 if k > 12 or γ < 6.
As shown in Proposition 4.1 and Proposition C.3, the profits and the consumer surplus in market 0 cannot be
worsened at the same time, but they cannot either be improved simultaneously. Thus, this proposition represents that
the decrease in profits is less significant than the gain in consumer surplus, the welfare of this market increases after
globalization, regardless of the relative size of the trading partner andwhich firm has technical advantage. Thus, if the
conditions lead to a reduction of the welfare of market 0, it would be better for this market if firm 0were friendly only to
local consumers.
Further, Proposition 4.2 requires a weaker condition than Proposition 3.12 that the local welfare of market 1 can be
better off. As shown, consumers inmarket 1 are always better off and the consumer-friendly firm is less aggressive. Also,
if the for-profit firm increases its output, a higher production guarantees a welfare gain for market 1. Thus, globalization
enhances the local welfare of market 1when the relativemarket size is nomore than approximately six times larger,
which is a weaker condition than that in Proposition 3.12.
Proposition 4.3 When the consumer-friendly firm only cares about its original consumers, globalization enhances the global
welfare regardless of the relative market size and technical advantage.
This proposition states that the possible loss of welfare in market 1 is always compensated by the gain in market 0.
This guarantee, in our setting, that global welfare won’t fall after globalization if firm 0 cares only for local consumers.
Again, if conditions for a increasing of global welfare in Proposition 3.13 are not satisfied, it would be better for the
global market if firm 0were friendly only to locals.
4.2 | When themarket is amixed oligopoly
Before globalization, a consumer-friendly firm in a market 0 becomes a public monopoly which maximizes the local
welfare ofmarket 0. However, if there is a rival firm in thismarket, then it becomes amixed duopoly, inwhich a consumer-
friendly firm competes with a for-profit firm. In that case, the total outputs and the profitability depends also on the
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technical advantage and the relative market size. Wewill extend this analysis of a localizedmixed duopoly model into a
globalizedmixed oligopoly market and examine the welfare consequences of competition effect.
Although a generalization with ni firms in each market is difficult, we can show an example with n0 = 2 firms in
market 0. The demand functions are given by Assumptions A1.1 and A2.1. Consider that firm 0 in market 0 is consumer-
friendly and produces an output q0,0. The for-profit in market 0 produces q0,1 units of the good. The firms inmarket 0
have identical cost: 12 q20,j , j ∈ {0, 1}.
The profits of the firms in market 0 are denoted as follows: before globalization, piB0,j = p0q0,j − 12 q20,j and after
globalization, piA0,j = pw q0,j − 12 q20,j . Before globalization firm 0 in market 0maximizesUB = piB0,0 + CS0(q0), where
q0 = q0,0 + q0,1. After globalization it maximizes:UA = piA0,0 + CS (Q ).
Firm 1 inmarket 1maximizes its own profits before and after globalization, as assumed in the previous section. Then,
firm 1 in market 1 chooses q1 to maximize its profits:before globalization, piB1 = p1q1 − 12 k q21 and after globalization,
piA1 = pw q1 − 12 k q21 .
Figure 2 and Figure 3 compare themixed duopoly and themixed oligopoly, and show the effects of globalization on
market 0 and 1, respectively.14
Proposition 4.4 In the case of mixed duopoly in market 0, globalization benefits consumers in the consumer-friendly firm’s
original market if 0 < γ < 2 and 0 < k < 2−γ2γ(1+γ) , while it benefits consumers in market 1 regardless of the relative market size
and technical advantage.
Proposition 4.5 In the case of mixed duopoly in market 0, globalization enhances the local welfare of market 0 either (i) if
k > 18 (4 +
√
70) ≈ 1.54583 and γ > 1 or (ii) if k > 1 and γ > 75 , while it enhances the local welfare of market 1 if 0 < γ < 3 or if
k > 0.25.
It implies that themore trading partners in market 0, for the consumers of market 0 to be better off after globaliza-
tion, it is required the less market 1’s size than twicemarket 0’s size and themore technical advantage bymarket 1’s
firm. This is becausemore competition induces the consumer-friendly firm to reduce its productionmore in themarket
0 after globalization, even though it will increase its total production in the global market.15 Hence, due to this output
substitution effect between the consumer-friendly firm and the for-profit firms, it requires certain conditions, but it is a
weaker than Proposition 3.5. Figure 2 also shows that market 0’s welfare improvement happens with large values of γ
and k , that is, if market 0 is very small and firms in themarket 0 have a higher technical advantage.
Similarly to the global duopoly case in Proposition 3.6, consumers in themarket 1 are better off after globalization,
regardless of the relative size of the trading partner and technical advantage, which is shown in Figure 3. However, the
welfare increases after globalization as well, if themarket 1’s size is less than three timesmarket 0’s size and the firm in
market 1 has not a sufficiently larger technical advantage, which is weaker condition than Proposition 3.6.
Finally, Figure 4 show the effects of globalization on global welfare. The global welfare increase in the oligopoly
case with a less restrictive value of k compared to the duopoly case. That is, it is sufficient that the firm in themarket 1
does not have a higher technical advantage, which is also weaker condition than Proposition 3.7. Hence, global welfare
might fall only when firms inmarket 0 are in technical disadvantage; however, that is not a sufficient condition.
14The equilibrium results before and after globalization, and the corresponding ratios are shown in Appendix D.
15Before globalization, the competition between a for-profit firm in the original market does not change the output of a consumer-friendly firm. Thus, there is
no output substitution effect between the consumer-friendly firm and the for-profit firms before globalization. This result contrastswith the result in amixed
duopoly where a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a for-profit firm in the samemarket. In that case, public firm cares not only consumer surplus
and its profit but also its rival firm’s profit. Thus, less production by the public firm reduces its production cost and thus raises industry profits even though
decreasing total outputs induce a loss of consumer surplus. Thus, thewelfare results depend on the output substitution effect and cost-saving effect between
the two firms. (See Matsumura (1998) and Lee and Hwang (2003)). However, in our setting it is not applied before globalization, but it can be applied after
globalization.
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F IGURE 2 Effects of globalization onmarket 0: MixedOligopoly Example
F IGURE 3 Effects of globalization onmarket 1: MixedOligopoly Example
Proposition 4.6 In the case of mixed duopoly in market 0, globalization enhances global welfare if k > 910 .
5 | CONCLUSION
Wehave studied the effects of uniting two separatedmarkets, eachmonopolized by a producer, into a single globalized
duopoly market. We consider one of firms is a consumer-friendly firm and examine the effect that technical advantage
and the relative markets size have on price, output, profits, consumer surplus and welfare ratios before and after
globalization. These ratios help us determinewhether or not globalization is good or not for firm, consumers and the
markets in general.
Our results suggest that despite the existence of a consumer-friendly firm, some of the consumersmay beworse
after globalization. Specifically, consumers in themarketwhich the consumer-friendlyfirm is frommayhave their surplus
reduced under certain conditions. It happens when the for-profit firm does not have sufficient technical advantage or it
has a relative larger market size of its original market. But, due to the existence of a consumer-friendly firm, consumers
in themarket of the for-profit firm are always better off after globalization than before.
Accordingly, under certain conditions of costs and relativemarket size, the welfare of onemarket or the other can
be reduced, even that of both simultaneously. If these conditions weremet it would be better, in a globalizing context,
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F IGURE 4 Effects of globalization onwelfare: MixedOligopoly Example
that the socially responsible company was friendly only with the consumers of its original market and not with those of
the global market.
Althoughwehaveadopted the simplest formulationof a two-marketswithonly onefirmeach, itwouldbe interesting
to study a multi-market model or markets with more than one firms in each market. It would be also necessary to
consider multiple for-profit and consumer-friendly firms. Further, we can consider howmuchweight consumer-friendly
firms place on consumer surplus. It remains for future research.
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A | EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS
Before globalization
q0 =
a
2
, p¯0 =
a
2
, and q1 = aγ2 + k γ , p1 =
a(1 + k γ)
2 + k γ
(10)
After globalization
q˜0 =
a(1 + γ)
2 + γ
, q˜1 =
a (1 + γ)2
(2 + γ) (2 + k (1 + γ)) , p˜w =
a (1 + γ) (1 + k (1 + γ))
(2 + γ) (2 + k (1 + γ)) (11)
B | PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS.
We find conditions under which the ratios are larger or smaller than 1. A ratio larger than 1 indicates that the variable
increases after globalization, if it is equal to 1 it remains the same, otherwise it decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
R
p
0 =
2 (1 + γ) (1 + k (1 + γ))
(2 + γ) (2 + k (1 + γ)) (12)
0 < k < 2
γ+γ2
then R p0 < 1. If k = 2γ+γ2 then R p0 = 1. Otherwise, R p0 > 1.Proof of Proposition 3.2
R
p
1 =
(2 + k γ)
(1 + k γ)
(1 + γ) (1 + k (1 + γ))
(2 + γ) (2 + k (1 + γ)) (13)
For any k > 0 and γ > 0, R p1 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
RQ =
2(γ + 1)(γk + 2)(γ + γk + k + 3) and R q0 = 2(1 + γ)2 + γ (14)
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For any k > 0 and γ > 0, we have R q0 > 1 and RQ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
R
q
1 =
(1 + γ)2(2 + k γ)
γ(2 + γ)(2 + k (1 + γ)) (15)
If k < 2
γ+γ2
then R q1 > 1. If k = 2γ+γ2 then R q1 = 1. Otherwise, R q1 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
R cs0 =
(
R
q (c)
0
)2
=
(
2(2 + (1 + k )(1 + γ))
(2 + γ)(2 + k (1 + γ))
)2
(16)
If 0 < k < 2
γ+γ2
, then R cs0 > 1. If k = 2γ+γ2 , then R cs0 = 1. R cs0 < 1 elsewhere.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
R cs1 =
(
R
q (c)
1
)2
=
( (2 + k γ)(2 + (1 + k )(1 + γ))
(2 + γ)(2 + k (1 + γ))
)2
(17)
For any k > 0 and γ > 0we have R cs1 > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Rpi0 =
4k (1 + γ)3
(2 + γ)2(2 + k (1 + γ)) (18)
If 0 < k < 2(2+γ)2γ(1+γ)(4+3γ) , then Rpi0 < 1.Otherwise, Rpi0 ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
Rpi1 =
(2 + k γ)(1 + γ)3
γ(2 + γ)2(2 + k (1 + γ)) (19)
If 0 < γ ≤ 12
(
−1 + √5
)
and k > 2
(
1−γ−γ2
)
γ(1+γ)(3+2γ) , or if γ > 12
(
−1 + √5
)
and k > 0 then Rpi1 < 1. Otherwise, Rpi1 ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.10
RW0 =
2
(
(3 + γ)2 + k 2(1 + γ)2(2 + γ(2 + γ)) + 2k (1 + γ)(4 + γ(3 + γ))
)
(2 + γ)2(2 + k (1 + γ))2 (20)
RW0 > 1 either (i) if k >
√
2
γ +
2
γ(1+γ) or (ii) if 0 < γ < −1 +
√
2 and 0 < k < −√2γ + 2γ(1+γ) . Otherwise, RW0 ≤ 1
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C | WHEN FIRM 0 ONLY CARES ABOUT THE CONSUMERS OF ITS ORIGINAL
MARKET.
Equilibrium output and price after globalization
q˜0 =
a(1 + γ)
(
2 + k + γ + 2k γ + k γ2
)
4 + 2k + 7γ + 6k γ + 2γ2 + 5k γ2 + k γ3
, q˜1 =
a(1 + γ)
(
1 + 3γ + γ2
)
4 + 2k + 7γ + 6k γ + 2γ2 + 5k γ2 + k γ3
,
p˜w =
a(1 + k + k γ)
(
1 + 3γ + γ2
)
4 + 7γ + 2γ2 + k
(
2 + 6γ + 5γ2 + γ3
) (21)
Price ratios
R
p
0 =
2(1 + k + k γ)(1 + γ(3 + γ))
4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)) (22)
If 0 < k < 1
γ+γ2
then R p0 < 1. If k = 1γ+γ2 then R p0 = 1. Otherwise, R p0 > 1.
R
p
1 =
(2 + k γ)(1 + k + k γ)(1 + γ(3 + γ))
(1 + k γ)(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ))) (23)
For any k > 0 and γ > 0, R p1 < 1.
Output ratios
R
q
0 =
2(1 + γ)
(
2 + γ + k (1 + γ)2
)
4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)) (24)
If 0 < k < 1
γ+γ2
then R q0 < 1. If k = 1γ+γ2 then R q0 = 1. Otherwise, R q0 > 1.
R
q
1 =
(1 + γ)(2 + k γ)(1 + γ(3 + γ))
γ(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ))) (25)
If k > 2+4γ+γ2
γ(1+γ)2 then R q1 < 1. If k = 2+4γ+γ
2
γ(1+γ)2 then R q1 = 1. Otherwise, R q1 > 1.
RQ =
2(1 + γ)2(2 + k γ)(3 + k + γ + k γ)
(2 + (2 + k )γ)(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ))) (26)
Total production increases if market 0 is the smallest or the same size as market 1. However, if it is very large compared
tomarket 1 and the consumer-friendly firm is at a lot of disadvantage, total production decreases after globalization.
Effects on consumer surplus
Proposition C.1 Globalization benefits consumers of consumer-friendly firm’s original market if and only if 0 < k < 1
γ+γ2
.
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R cs0 =
4(1 + γ)2(3 + k + γ + k γ)2
(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (27)
If 0 < k < 1
γ+γ2
, then R cs0 > 1. If k = 1γ+γ2 , then R cs0 = 1. R cs0 < 1 elsewhere.
Proposition C.2 Consumers in market 1 are better off after globalization, regardless of the relative size of the trading partner
and which firm has technical advantage.
R cs1 =
(1 + γ)2(2 + k γ)2(3 + k + γ + k γ)2
(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (28)
R cs1 > 1 for all k > 0 and γ > 0
Effects on profits
Proposition C.3 Globalization benefits the consumer-friendly firm if and only if k > 1
γ+γ2
Rpi0 =
4(1 + γ)
(
2 + γ + k (1 + γ)2
)
(γ(3 + γ) + k (1 + γ)(1 + γ(4 + γ)))
(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (29)
Proposition C.4 Globalization benefits the for-profit firm if and only if 0 < k < k pi , where k pi = 1−γ−6γ2−2γ3
γ(3+10γ+9γ2+2γ3) +√
(1+3γ+γ2)2(1+5γ+10γ2+4γ3)
γ2(1+γ)3(3+7γ+2γ2)2 .
Rpi1 =
(1 + γ)(2 + k γ)(2 + k + k γ)(1 + γ(3 + γ))2
γ(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (30)
Effects on market’s welfare and global welfare
Proposition C.5 Globalization enhances market 0’s welfare, regardless of the relative size of the trading partner and which
firm has technical advantage.
RW0 =
2(1 + γ)
(
(3 + γ)(3 + 2γ(3 + γ)) + k 2(1 + γ)3(2 + γ(4 + γ)) + 2k (1 + γ)(2 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ))
)
(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (31)
RW0 > 1 for any k > 0 and γ > 0.
Proposition C.6 If k > 12 or γ < 6 then globalization enhances the welfare of the for-profit firm’s original market.
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RW1 =
(1 + γ)(2 + k γ)2
(
2 + k 2γ(1 + γ)3 + γ(1 + γ)(3 + γ)(7 + 3γ) + k (1 + γ)(1 + γ(1 + γ)(3 + γ)(4 + γ))
)
γ(3 + k γ)(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2 (32)
RW1 > 1 if k > 12 or γ < 6.
Proposition C.7 Globalization enhances world welfare, regardless of the relative size of the markets and which firm has
technical advantage.
RW =
2(1 + γ)2(2 + k γ)2
(
11 + k 2(1 + γ)2(2 + γ(5 + γ)) + γ(31 + 3γ(6 + γ)) + k (9 + γ(32 + γ(31 + γ(10 + γ))))
)
(4 + γ(7 + 2γ) + k (1 + γ)(2 + γ(4 + γ)))2(4 + γ(6 + k (4 + (2 + k )γ))) (33)
RW > 1 for any k > 0 and γ > 0.
D | MIXED OLIGOPOLY CASE
Equilibrium before globalization
q¯0,0 =
a
2
, q¯0,1 =
a
6
, p¯0 =
a
3
and q¯1 = aγ
2 + k γ
, p¯1 =
a(γk + 1)
γk + 2
Equilibrium after globalization
q˜0,0 =
a(1 + γ)
2 + γ
, q˜0,1 =
a(1 + γ)2(1 + k + k γ)
(2 + γ) (5 + 3k + 2γ + 4k γ + k γ2) ,
q˜1 =
a(1 + γ)2
5 + 3k + 2γ + 4k γ + k γ2
, p˜w =
a(γ + 1)(γk + k + 1)
2γ + (γ + 1)(γ + 3)k + 5
Ratios
R
p
0 =
3(1 + γ)(1 + k + k γ)
5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ) , R
p
1 =
(1 + γ)(2 + k γ)(1 + k + k γ)
(1 + k γ)(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ)) (34)
R
q (c)
0 =
3(4 + γ + 2k (1 + γ))
2(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ)) , R
q (c)
1 =
(2 + k γ)(4 + γ + 2k (1 + γ))
5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ) (35)
R
q
0,0 =
2(1 + γ)
2 + γ
, R
q
0,1 =
6(1 + γ)2(1 + k + k γ)
(2 + γ)(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ)) , R
q
1 =
(1 + γ)2(2 + k γ)
γ(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ)) (36)
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RCS0 =
9(4 + γ + 2k (1 + γ))2
4(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2 , R
CS
1 =
(2 + k γ)2(4 + γ + 2k (1 + γ))2
(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2 (37)
Rpi0,0 =
12(1 + γ)2
(
−1 + k (1 + γ)2
)
(2 + γ)2(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ)) , R
pi
0,1 =
12(1 + γ)3(3 + γ)(1 + k + k γ)2
(2 + γ)2(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2
Rpi1 =
(1 + γ)3(2 + k γ)(2 + k + k γ)
γ(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2
(38)
RW0 = 18
©­­«
62 + 94γ + 55γ2 + 16γ3 + 2γ4 + 2k 2(1 + γ)2
(
11 + 18γ + 14γ2 + 6γ3 + γ4
)
+ 2k
(
36 + 91γ + 91γ2 + 49γ3 + 15γ4 + 2γ5
) ª®®¬
11(2 + γ)2(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2 (39)
RW1 =
(2 + k γ)2
(
2 + 4k 2γ(1 + γ)2 + γ(22 + γ(14 + 3γ)) + k (1 + γ)(1 + γ(19 + γ(7 + γ)))
)
γ(3 + k γ)(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2 (40)
RW = 18(1 + γ)(2 + k γ)2
( (7 + γ(5 + γ))(10 + γ(10 + 3γ)) + 2k 2(1 + γ)2(11 + γ(15 + γ(7 + γ)))
+ k (1 + γ)(76 + γ(114 + γ(63 + γ(14 + γ))))
)
(2 + γ)2(5 + 2γ + k (1 + γ)(3 + γ))2(44 + γ(54 + k (44 + (18 + 11k )γ))) (41)
